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WAITING FOR UNCLE SAM TO BUY THE
FARM ... FOREST, OR WETLAND? A CALL
FOR NEW EMPHASIS ON STATE AND LOCAL
LAND USE CONTROLS IN NATURAL
RESOURCE PROTECTION
John M. Vandlik*
In 1864, the naturalist George Perkins Marsh wrote of "civi-
lized" man's inevitable destruction of the natural world. He mar-
veled at the speed with which such degradation had already over-
taken the North American continent:
Comparatively short as is the period through which the coloni-
zation of foreign lands by European emigrants extends, great,
and, it is to be feared, sometimes irreparable, injury has been
already done in the various processes by which man seeks to
subjugate the virgin earth; and many provinces, first trodden by
the homo sapiens Europae within the last two centuries, begin to
show signs of that melancholy dilapidation which is now driving
so many of the peasantry of Europe from their native hearths.'
To Marsh, such problems were caused from the abuse of the
land, not its use.2 Rural-based industry was not necessarily a
problem, but the consumption of the land was a problem that
threatened society as a whole. Indeed, he asserted that it was in
the "general interests of humanity, that this decay should be ar-
rested." 3 One method he suggested was that "future operations
.of rural husbandry and of forest industry, in districts yet remain-
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Board, where he served as the Attorney Assistant to the Chairman. His
previous article, Voting for Smokey Bear: Political Accountability and the New
Chief of the Forest Service, appears at PuB. ADMiN. RFN., May 1, 1995, avail-
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article are his own and do not represent those of the United States De-
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1. GEORGE PERKINS MARSH, MAN AND NATURE 46 (David Lowenthal
ed., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1965) (1864).
2. See id. at 36, 280.
3. Id. at 46.
692 fORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII
ing substantially in their native condition, should be so con-
ducted as to prevent the widespread mischiefs." 4 Marsh recog-
nized government's natural role in providing for the public
interest, and he was skeptical that the commercial dealings of
private corporations would yield results which met that interest.5
Yet, he seemed to have faith in the American experiment of
the private laborer-landowner, provided that the landowner was
adequately educated in the needs of the land. The "safeguards"
of proper land use would be guaranteed by the landowner alone.
Marsh maintained:
This can be done only by the diffusion of knowledge on this
subject among the classes that, in earlier days, subdued and til-
led ground in which they had no vested rights, but who, in our
time, own their woods, their pastures, and their ploughlands as
perpetual possession for them and theirs, and have, therefore,
a strong interest in the protection of their domain against
deterioration.6
Unfortunately, reality has never matched Marsh's nineteenth
century optimism. Marsh's distrust of inherently self-interested
corporations applies equally well to -the individual landowner.
Contrary to Marsh's contention, ownership interest translates
into self interest of the landowner, not a trustee's interest in the
land.7 Pecuniary interest of the landowner, not the public inter-
est, drives private land use decisions in this country.8 That has
been, and still is, the rule, not the exception.
Consumptive land use still dominates 130 years after Marsh
idealistically thought it would whither in the enlightenment of
education. Now, the rural environment is primarily consumed by
residential and commercial development of the land.
Modem approaches to natural resource protection recognize
the pecuniary foundation of private land use decisions, yet they
often attempt to combat the problem by further solidifying that
4. Id.
5. See id. at 51 n.53.
6. Id. at 46.
7. Cf Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 1269, 1276 (1993) (explaining that "[w]hen the land is owned by
an individual and is managed for that human's more-or-less exclusive
benefit, we must expect, as indeed we find, that long-term degradation
of the Earth counts for little.")
8. See id.
WAITING FOR UNCLE SAM
base. 9 Instead of insisting that landowners desist in land use prac-
tices that are considered harmful to the public interest, govern-
ment often seeks to "buy out" the landowner. Societal interests
enter a bidding war, on the open market, for the landowner's co-
operation. While this is perhaps the least confrontational method
of achieving private natural resource protection, it is also an inef-
ficient and unnecessary means to a long-recognized and neces-
sary public end.10
This article will explore the advantages of state or local land
use controls and the pitfalls of government acquisition of conser-
vation easements. Part I of this article will discuss the federal
government's role in protecting natural resources through the
acquisition of conservation easements, as exemplified by two fed-
eral programs. It will note the inherent inefficiencies of such
programs. Part II will then argue the viability of state or local
land use controls, as an alternative to federal acquisition and
provide a review of recent United States Supreme Court takings
decisions. It will finally explore how one state, Wisconsin, has in-
tegrated that jurisprudence in the context of zoning for the pro-
tection of natural resources.
I. THE FEDERAL ROLE IN NATURAL RESOURCE PROTECTION
THROUGH ACQUISiION OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
Even in the Nineteenth Century, Marsh recognized the differ-
ence between land-sensitive forestry/farming uses and uses which
consume the rural character of the land. The former was to be
encouraged and the latter decried. Today's society has also recog-
nized the inherent value of such rural land uses by enacting laws
to preserve those private uses through the expenditure of public
funds.
Two federal programs exemplify the government's interest in
keeping land in a rural, farm or forest based use. In these pro-
grams, that interest is advanced by the government's purchase of
private interests, such as conservation easements. The Forest Leg-
acy Program1 was adopted as a part of the 1990 Farm Bill.12 It
9. See discussion infta Parts I.A & B.
10. See discussion infra Part I.C.
11. 16 U.S.C. § 2103c (1994).
12. Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
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authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture, through the Forest Ser-
vice, to purchase conservation easements 3 in order to prevent
"environmentally important forested areas from conversion to
non-forest uses."14 The Wetland Reserve Program (the "WRP")15
was adopted under the 1985 Farm Bill.' 6 Here, too, the Secretary
of Agriculture, through the Natural Resource Conservation Ser-
vice (the "NRCS"), is authorized to purchase conservation ease-
ments in order to "provide for the restoration and protection of
the functional values of wetland." 17
The federal government certainly has a legitimate interest in
purchasing land or interests in land to achieve natural resource
protection. Indeed, the Forest Service and National Forests were
created to protect the nation's forestlands from imprudent ex-
ploitation by the timber industry." It was believed that ownership
by the federal government, with the management aim of sound
scientific forestry, would provide the most effective means of pro-
tecting the nation's forest resources. 19 Unlike the National For-
ests reserved from the public domain in the West, Eastern Na-
tional Forests were built parcel by parcel, as the federal
government purchased land from private landowners, as well as
local governments, pursuant to the Weeks Act.20 Acquisition of
private land for the National Forest System still continues. In the
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Congress au-
thorized the expenditure of $40,575,000 from the Land and
Water Conservation Fund for the Forest Service to acquire lands
tions of 7 U.S.C. and 16 U.S.C.).
13. While the Forest Legacy Law allows for the fee simple
purchase of lands, the purchase of conservation easements has been
the predominant focus of the program. See discussion infra Part I.A.
14. See 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(a) (1994). Recent amendments to the
Forest Legacy Law allow states to purchase Forest Legacy conservation
easements with grant money from the Forest Service. See supra note 11.
15. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1637 et seq. (1994).
16. See Food Security Act of 1985 § 221, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99
Stat. 1507.
17. 16 U.S.C. § 3837a(b)(1994).
18. See generally GIFOIRD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEw GROUND 84-85
(1974).
19. See id. at 293.
20. See 16 U.S.C. § 515 (1994).
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and interests in lands.21
Given the federal goal of active management of the forests,
outright fee simple ownership of the land by the United States is
the simplest way to achieve the necessary control over the re-
source. The Forest Service is directed by law to manage the Na-
tional Forests for "outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed,
and wildlife and fish purposes. '22 This affirmative control, or
management, over the land, including the public's use of the
land, is distinctly different from the federal government merely
seeking to limit how land is used. Adding to the equation the
factor that the land to be restricted remains in private owner-
ship, yields a product quite unlike the traditional model of fed-
eral ownership.
In these times of federal deficit concerns, federal agencies are
faced with having to achieve their missions with increasingly lim-
ited budget dollars. At the same time, perhaps in part to justify
downsizing of federal agencies, there exists a current trend in
federal government that allows state and local governments to
take over the field of play, leaving the federal government on
the bench merely to cheer them on and monitor game strategy.23
While federal natural resource agencies were largely formed to
address the national interest in natural resource protection or
21. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3206 (1996).
22. Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960 § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 528
(1994). This section also states that "[n]othing herein shall be con-
strued so as to affect the use or administration of the mineral re-
sources of national forest lands" and the purposes of § 528 are to be
considered supplemental to the purposes set forth at 16 U.S.C. § 475,
which are "to improve and protect the forest", "secur[e] favorable con-
ditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber."
23. An example of this in the welfare arena is the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.), where the Federal welfare program will be ad-
ministered through block grants to the states, effectively giving the
states greater control over this Federal program. The House Confer-
ence Report explains that the block grant aspect "restores the State's
fundamental role in assisting needy families" and that "[t]he best wel-
fare solutions come from those closest to the problems - not from bu-
reaucrats in Washington." H.R. REP. No. 104-725, at 8897 (1996).
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preservation, it must be admitted that those missions have ex-
panded to effectively include the protection of state and even lo-
cal interests. 24 With federal budget limitations as a primary con-
cern, it would not be surprising if this "mission creep" were
assailed as an unnecessary luxury. That is, the expenditure of
federal money for the purchase of conservation easements as a
federal means of controlling private land use may not weather
political scrutiny in the current fiscal context. Certainly, it is not
unreasonable to expect that the federal government should first
take care of assets that it owns outright through properly funded
maintenance and administration.
It also cannot be ignored that many state and local officials
are attempting to pull more decision-making influence from the
federal government in the natural resource field; it is not merely
the case of possible abdication of federal roles.2s While some lo-
cal officials seek local control over federal lands, the concept is
one that cannot be legally defended, as evidenced in the recent
Nye County, Nevada litigation.26 Similarly, attempts to convey fed-
eral land to the states for management purposes run counter to
the legitimate and traditional federal role in natural resource
ownership and management that has existed in our laws and gov-
ernment over the past century."
24. See, e.g., Laura S. Beliveau, Comment, The Forest Legacy Program:
Using Conservation Easements to Preserve the Northern Forest, 20 B.C. ENVrL.
Ar . L. REv. 507, 508-09 (1993) (arguing that the impetus for the Forest
Legacy Program arose from the inadequacy of state and local zoning
measures to prevent development and harsh logging practices in the
Northern Forest Lands).
25. See John W. Hart, National Forest Planning: An Opportunity For
Local Governments to Influence Federal Land Use, 16 PUB. LAND L. REv. 137,
138-39 (1995).
26. United States v. Nye County, 920 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Nev. 1996)
(holding that Nye County has no authority to manage roads on Na-
tional Forest System land).
27. An example of this concept may be found in Senate Bill 1254,
the Public Land Management Responsibility and Accountability Resto-
ration Act of 1997, which was sponsored by Senator Larry Craig of
Idaho and introduced in the 105th Congress. The bill would allow for
the option of state management, and eventual ownership, of Federal
lands currently administered by the Forest Service and Bureau of Land
Management. See 143 CONG. REc. S10,330-32 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1997)
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Still, state and local governments may be quite willing, and ap-
propriately so, to again become the central battlegrounds for
natural resource protection issues involving non-federal land.
With a "New Federalism" alive and well, we should not view envi-
ronmental or natural resource protection as being merely a fed-
eral role. With respect to the federal programs of Forest Legacy
and Wetland Reserve, there is nothing inherently federal about
the objective, which is to control the use of private land.
A. The Forest Legacy Program
Under the Forest Legacy Program,2 conservation easements
are acquired for the purpose of "protecting environmentally im-
portant private forest lands that may be threatened by conversion
to nonforest uses." 29 In short, the conservation easements are to
be used for "promoting forest land protection and other conser-
vation opportunities," such as "the protection of important
scenic, cultural, fish, wildlife, and recreational resources, riparian
areas, and other ecological values." 30 The conservation easements
acquired by the Forest Service, or by the states with grant money
from the Forest Service,31 "may allow forest management activi-
ties, including timber management." 32 While the owner may not
convert use of the property to uses inconsistent with the Forest
(section-by-section description of the Federal Lands Management Ad-
justment Act inserted into remarks by Sen. Larry Craig).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 2103c (1994).
29. § 2103c(a); see also Revised Forest Legacy Program Guidelines,
61 Fed. Reg. 53,188 (1996) (guidelines effective Oct. 10, 1996).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(a).
31. Section 374 of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Re-
form Act of 1996 amended the Forest Legacy Law by allowing states to
purchase Forest Legacy conservation easements with Federal funds
granted by the Secretary of Agriculture. Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat.
888, 1015 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(l)). It also made
amendments to the WRP. § 333, 110 Stat. at 995. Interestingly, the act
created a new authority for U.S.D.A. to acquire up to $35 million worth
of conservation easements over farmland with "prime, unique, or other
productive soil that is subject to a pending offer from a state or local
government for the purpose of protecting topsoil by limiting nonagri-
cultural uses of the land." § 388, 110 Stat. at 1020-21.
32. 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(h)(1).
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Legacy Program, " [h]unting, fishing, hiking, and similar recrea-
tional uses shall not be considered inconsistent with the pur-
poses of this program." 3 The conservation easements are to be
acquired from willing landowners for fair market value, as deter-
mined by federal appraisal and acquisition standards and
procedures.34
Pursuant to the Implementation Guidelines developed by the
Forest Service, the state, rather than the federal government, de-
termines which forested areas are "environmentally important"
and "threatened by conversion to nonforest uses."35 The state
even prioritizes the tracts over which conservation easements
should be purchased first.3 6 This is true whether it is the Forest
Service or the state which actually acquires the conservation ease-
ment. Even when the federal government is the entity which
purchases the easement, the law allows the federal government
to delegate or assign management and enforcement responsibili-
ties to state or local governments. 3 7
The key, though, is that even after the sale of the conservation
easement, the landowner may make economic use of the prop-
erty burdened with the conservation easement.38 Indeed, the For-
est Service's Guidelines list, as one of the public values to be pro-
tected by the Forest Legacy, the ability of the land to "[p]rovide
opportunities for the continuation of traditional forest uses, such
as forest management, timber harvesting, other commodity use,
and outdoor recreation."3 9 While public access may be acquired
under a conservation easement, 40 the Forest Service Guidelines
do not require that the public be allowed on the conservation
33. § 2103c(I).
34. See § 2103c(c), (j)(1).
35. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE,
FOREST LEGACY PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES 5-6 (Aug. 15,
1996) [hereinafter FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES]; see also Revised Forest
Legacy Program Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 53,188 (1996).
36. See Revised Forest Legacy Program Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at
53,189.
37. See 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(h) (2).
38. See § 2103c(h) (1).
39. FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 6.
40. See 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(c).
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easement area for recreational pursuits. 4' The state must also
contribute at least 25% of the total cost of the Forest Legacy ac-
quisition program.42 That contribution may be made, in-kind,
through management and administration activities. 43
B. The Wetland Reserve Program
The Wetland Reserve Program (WRP)," which is administered
by the NRCS, directs that conservation easements be acquired
"to provide for the restoration and protection of the functional
values of wetland." 45 The law contains no express prohibitions on
use that must be contained within every WRP conservation ease-
ment. Conservation easement terms are largely dependent upon
the development of tract specific restrictions via a plan, and the
restrictions may or may not be definitively articulated by the con-
servation easement itself.4 Often, particular uses are allowed by
approval of a local NRCS official. 47 Like the Forest Legacy Pro-
gram, acquisition of a conservation easement is not intended to
remove all economic uses from the property." The law provides
that
[w]etland reserve program lands may be used for compatible
economic uses, including such activities as hunting and fishing,
managed timber harvest, or periodic haying or grazing, if such
use is specifically permitted by the plan and consistent with the
long-term protection and enhancement of the wetlands re-
sources for which the easement was established.49
Under the terms of the conservation easement, the landowner
retains control over public access on the easement area.50
The WRP conservation easements are not to be purchased for
more than fair market value.51 While temporary easements may
41. See FoREST SERVICE GUIELINES, supra note 35, at 5-6.
42. See 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(j) (2).
43. See id.
44. See 16 U.S.C. § 3837a(b) (1994).
45. Id.
46. See § 3837a(b)(2).
47. See § 3837a(c).
48. See § 3837a(d).
49. Id.
50. See § 3837a(b) (1) (B).
51. See § 3837a(f).
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be purchased under the WRP, the law directs the Secretary of
Agriculture to "give priority to obtaining permanent conserva-
tion easements." 52 With respect to permanent conservation ease-
ments and in addition to the conservation easement purchase
price, the federal government shall pay at least 75%, and up to
100%, of the costs53 for implementing "conservation measures"
and the "protection of the wetland functions and values" as di-
rected by the plan.14 The U.S.D.A. is also directed to "provide
necessary technical assistance to assist owners in complying with
the terms and conditions of the easement and the plan." 55 As in
the Forest Legacy. Program, the federal government "may dele-
gate any of the easement management, monitoring, and enforce-
ment responsibilities" to state authorities. 56
C. Inefficiencies in this Federal Role
In the case of both the Forest Legacy Program and WRP con-
servation easements, the federal purchase, or federally funded
purchase, of conservation easements does not necessarily involve
the acquisition of any affirmative rights that the federal govern-
ment may exercise on the property.57 Instead, such conservation
easements equate to negative easements intended to limit the
use of the land in order to keep it in substantially the same con-
dition as it was prior to the easement.
The purpose of the Forest Legacy conservation easement is to
52. § 3837c(d). The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform
Act of 1996, supra note 31, effectively placed greater emphasis on the
acquisition of temporary, as opposed to permanent, easements. In
amending 16 U.S.C. § 3837, the act provides that, beginning October 1,
1996, acreage enrolled in the WRP should be categorized as follows:
one-third in permanent easements; one-third in 30-year easements; and
one-third in cost-share agreements. Also, the act directed U.S.D.A. not
to acquire additional permanent easements until at least 75,000 acres
in the WRP are enrolled as temporary easements. Pub. L. No. 104-127,
110 Stat. 888, 995.
53. See 16 U.S.C. § 3837c(b) (1) (A).
54. See § 3837c(a)(1).
55. § 3837c(a)(2).
56. § 3837f(a).
57. Of course, in both instances the United States obtains the af-
firmative right to enforce the terms of the conservation easement itself.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2103(I), 3837f(a).
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prevent conversion to nonforest uses.58 While the WRP easement
is geared to "restore" wetland values, the federal government
must pay for most, if not all, of the restoration costs, notwith-
standing that it already owns a conservation easement on the
land. 9 Under the Forest Legacy Program, public access, for pur-
poses such as outdoor recreation, may be acquired, but it is not
mandated.6° With WRP, the landowner retains control over any
public access to the conservation easement area. Both types of
conservation easements allow continued economic use of the
property.61
Interestingly, even when these conservation easements are held
by the United States of America,62 the state, and even local gov-
ernments, in the case of the Forest Legacy Program, may eventu-
ally manage, monitor, and enforce the terms of the conservation
easements.6
While in the context of the overall federal budget, the amount
of federal money spent in acquiring these types of conservation
easements is minuscule, in actual dollars it is not insignificant.
Since Fiscal Year 1992, Congress has appropriated a net $25.848
million64 to acquire Forest Legacy conservation easements and
58. See 16 U.S.C. § 2103(a).
59. See 16 U.S.C. § 3837c(b)(1)(A).
60. See FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 6.
61. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2103c(h) (1), 3837a(d).
62. As previously noted, Forest Legacy conservation easements may
also be acquired by a state with federal funds. See supra note 31 and ac-
companying text.
63. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
64. The Forest Legacy Program is funded under the Department
of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. The following
are the fiscal year and corresponding amounts allocated to Forest Leg-
acy, per the House Conference Report, for that year's act: FY 92, $5
million (Pub. L. No. 102-154; H.R CoNF. REP. No. 102-256, at 59); FY
93, $10 million (Pub. L. No. 102-381; H.R CONF. REP. No. 102-901, at
50); FY 94, $6.948 million (Pub. L. No. 103-138; H.R. CoNF. REP. No.
103-299, at 38); FY 95, $6.7 million (Pub. L. No. 103-332; H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 103-740, at 39, H.R. REP. No. 103-551, at 74), rescinded $7.8
million (Pub. L. No. 104-19, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-124, at 85); FY96,
$3 million (Pub. L. No. 104-134, H.R1 CONF. REP. No. 104-537, at 424,
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-402, at 50, HR. REP. No. 104-173, at 68); FY 97,
$2 million (Pub. L. No. 104-208, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-863, at 1010).
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$343.2 million 6 for the WRP. In an era of fiscal conservatism
such expenditures will not necessarily escape scrutiny.
There is nothing uniquely federal about the goals of the For-
est Legacy and WRP conservation easement acquisitions; the
same objectives of natural resource protection can be achieved
through the exercise of old fashioned state and local land use
control authorities. 66 Moreover, a state and local government can
accomplish these same natural resource objectives without any
direct cost to the taxpayer. In that light, it may be argued that
the federal, or federally funded, purchase of conservation ease-
ments is not the most fiscally conservative means of natural re-
source protection.
These federal acquisitions also lack the political accountability
inherent in land use control actions taken by state or local au-
thorities. The conservation easements are negotiated between a
private landowner and federal agency officials. The specific terms
of the conservation easement will not necessarily reflect state or
65. The WRP is funded under the Agriculture, Rural Develop-
ment, Food and Drug Administration and Related Agencies Appropria-
tions Act. The following are the fiscal years and corresponding
amounts allocated to WRP for that years act: FY 92, $46.357 million
(Pub. L. No. 102-142, 105 Stat. 878, 897); FY 93, $0.0 (Pub. L. No. 102-
341), $60 million emergency supplemental for flood damage clean up,
of which funds may be utilized by WRP, provided certain conditions ex-
ist (Pub. L. No. 103-75, 107 Stat. 739, 742); FY 94, $66.675 million (Pub.
L. No. 103-111, 107 Stat. 1046, 1064); FY 95, $93.2 million (Pub. L. No.
103-330, 108 Stat. 2435, 2453); FY 96, $77 million (Pub. L. No. 104-37,
109 Stat. 299, 315); FY 97, none expressly appropriated (Pub. L. No.
104-180). The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act, supra
note 31, directed that the Commodity Credit Corporation fund the
WRP. Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 888, 1007. The House Conference
Report 104-726, which accompanied Pub. L. No. 104-180, explains:
"Both the Wetlands Reserve Program and the Conservation Reserve
Program were previously funded through appropriated accounts, but
the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act provides that
these programs now be administered through funds provided directly
from the Commodity Credit Corporation."
66. See Beliveau, supra note 24, at 524, who concedes that with the
Forest Legacy Program, the federal government is attempting "to per-
form what traditionally has been a local function."
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local concerns or desires relative to particular, local land use
issues.
The purchase of an individual conservation easement, even by
the government, is a transaction that is more private than public
in nature. On the other hand, action by local officials through
the zoning process is fundamentally public. The zoning decision-
making process often affords the opportunity for public debate
and dialogue. There is also accountability of the decision makers
to the public through the local electoral process.
Given that state and local authorities can accomplish the same
natural resource protection ends through land use controls
which need not cause the expenditure of public funds and given
that such a process is inherently responsive to the will of the ma-
jority, it is difficult to ignore, or discount, this method of natural
resource protection. Indeed, these very attributes argue forcefully
that land use controls be considered a primary means of natural
resource protection. Furthermore, fiscal constraints at the federal
level as well as the movement in political dialogue to take deci-
sions away from federal bureaucrats and place them in the hands
of state and local governments may very well conspire to elimi-
nate federal programs, like the Forest Legacy Program and WRP,
that buy such natural resource protection.
Even if not persuaded as to the correctness of such an out-
come, those interested in natural resource protection might have
to consider it, anyway, as an imminent reality. This is not to say
that the possible passing of federal dollars for the purchase of
conservation easements must be viewed as defeat in the war for
natural resource protection. Rather, it should be viewed as a
time to regroup the troops on a new field of battle.
II. NATURAL RESOURCE PROTECTION THROUGH STATE OR LocAL
LAND USE CoNTRoLs
State or local land use control authorities are a viable means
of achieving natural resource protection. This is particularly so
when government intervention is only needed to restrict what
one may do with one's land. In particular, land use controls can
be an extremely efficient means for the public to address natural
resource protection when exercised in situations where the fol-
lowing three conditions are present: (1) the public, or govern-
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ment agencies, need not possess the private property to meet the
natural resource objectives; (2) the private property is already in
a condition that essentially achieves the natural resource objec-
tives; and (3) some economic use may be made of the property
even after imposition of the land use controls. Additionally, as an
exercise of government authority, local land use restrictions be-
come a function of local public support.
Due to some well-publicized cases, some may believe that the
United States Supreme Court, in the name of the Fifth Amend-
ment, has taken the steam out of the local land use controls en-
gine, depriving it of the ability to pull the full load needed for
natural resource protection.67 However, that is a misconception.
The fear of takings is perhaps more potent than the law of tak-
ings, when it comes to any perceived inability to exercise local
land use controls through the long-recognized constitutionally
sound tool of zoning.68
The type of zoning restrictions necessary to accomplish the
same goals as conservation easement programs such as Forest
Legacy Program and WRP do not legitimately raise takings con-
cerns. While the law of takings is not always clear, the legislative
exercise of zoning authority finds sufficient foothold to withstand
takings challenges with some degree of certainty.
A. Federal Courts on Takings
In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Supreme Court reviewed condi-
tions imposed on a permit to expand an existing retail store. 69
67. See, e.g., Tom Arrandale, Environmental Regulation and The Pri-
vate-Property Line, GOVERNING, June 1994, at 82 (discussing Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Counci4 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), anticipating a decision in
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) and noting that "[a]ctivist
courts and state legislatures could wind up eroding governments' fun-
damental authority to look out for the common good."); James W. Ely
Jr., A Breather on the Takings Clause, A.BA J. 42-43 (Jan. 1996) (discuss-
ing Dolan, 512 U.S. 374 and Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987), and concluding that these decisions are a "strong signal
that the constitutional tide has turned in favor of private property
rights.").
68. See generally, infra Part 11A.
69. 512 U.S. 374.
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The conditions required that the landowner dedicate her prop-
erty abutting a creek as a public greenway and that she allow a
public bike path through her property. The Court found that
these conditions involving public access violated the Fifth
Amendment because there was no "rough proportionality" be-
tween the conditions imposed and the public burdens resulting
from the expanded development of the store.70
In deciding Dolan, the requirements of mandating public rec-
reational use along the creek's greenway and the bike path were
determinative of the Court's takings conclusion. The discussion
on the greenway is particularly revealing.
[The city] not only wanted petitioner not to build in the
floodplain, but it also wanted petitioner's property along Fanno
Creek for its greenway system. The city has never said why a
public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required in
the interest of flood control.
The difference to petitioner, of course, is the loss of her abil-
ity to exclude others. As we have noted, this right to exclude
others is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property." Kaiser
Aetna, 444 U.S., at 176. It is difficult to see why recreational visi-
tors trampling along petitioner's floodplain easement are suffi-
ciently related to the city's legitimate interest in reducing flood-
ing problems along Fanno Creek .... 71
However, the Court took care to distinguish the Dolan situa-
tion from one involving more general and traditional zoning re-
quirements. The Court explained:
[T]he authority of state and local governments to engage in
land use planning has been sustained against constitutional
challenge as long ago as our decision in Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 ... (1926). "Government hardly could go on
if to some extent values incident to property could not be di-
minished without paying for every such change in the general
law." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 ...
(1922). A land use regulation does not effect a taking if it "sub-
stantially advance[s] legitimate state interests" and does not
"den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land." Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).72
70. Id. at 391.
71. Id. at 393.
72. Id. at 384-85.
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In Dolan, the Court suggested that the above-quoted analysis had
continued validity when land use controls were imposed via "es-
sentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the
city,"73 and when the land use restriction was merely "a limita-
tion on the use [the landowner] might make of her own
parcel." 74
When land use controls also effectively allow continued eco-
nomic use of the property, the taking situation addressed in Lu-
cas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, is not implicated.75 Lucas con-
cerned a situation where a state land use restriction was
concluded, by the trial court, to have rendered the subject prop-
erty valueless.76 The Court of Appeals decision in Florida Rock In-
dustries v. United States7 explained the impact of Lucas on existing
takings law as follows:
How to determine whether a regulatory taking under the Fifth
Amendment has occurred is a subject of on-going debate. The
Supreme Court has provided various articulations, influenced,
as could be expected, by the particular circumstances of the
cases before it. One formula that has emerged and has been re-
peated in several cases requires that the court balance several
pragmatic considerations in making its regulatory takings deter-
mination. These considerations include: the economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant, the extent to which the regu-
lation interferes with investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the Government action. (The leading case is Penn.
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
• . .(1978))....
The recent Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 . . . (1992), teaches that the eco-
nomic impact factor alone may be determinative; in some cir-
cumstances, no balancing of factors is required. If a regulation
categorically prohibits all economically beneficial use of land -
destroying its economic value for private ownership - the reg-
73. Id. at 385. Such a situation is unlike that in Dolan which in-
volved "an adjudicative decision to condition . . . [an] application for a
building permit on an individual parcel." Id.
74. Id. Again, the Court contrasted this type of situation with the
challenged requirement in Dolan, which required that "she deed por-
tions of the property to the city" for use as a public bikeway. Id.
75. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
76. Id. at 1016 n.7.
77. 18 E3d 1560, 1564-65, (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1109 (1995).
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ulation has an effect equivalent to a permanent physical occu-
pation. There is, without more, a compensable taking.
If, however, a regulation prohibits less than all economically
beneficial use of the land and causes at most a partial destruc-
tion of its value, the case does not come within the Supreme
Court's "categorical" taking rule.7"
As a result, if property may be used for some economical pur-
pose after imposition of a land use control, then a categorical
taking, as discussed in Lucas, is not present.
Agins v. Tiburon presents a situation more analogous to the
type of natural resource protection that is the focus of this arti-
cle. 79 After Agins purchased five acres in the City of Tiburon,
California, the city re-zoned the parcel to effectively limit resi-
dential development and protect open space. Agins brought an
inverse condemnation action against Tiburon as a result of the
re-zoning. The Supreme Court concluded that there was no
taking.80
The Court succinctly articulated the principle with respect to
zoning laws and takings. "The application of a general zoning
law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does
not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an
owner economically viable use of his land."81 In concluding that
the zoning ordinance "substantially advance[d] legitimate gov-
ernment goals," the Court noted the State's statutory provision
which provided that the "development of local open-space plans
will discourage the 'premature and unnecessary conversion of
open-space land to urban uses.' "82 The Court further stated that
"[t]he specific zoning regulations at issue are exercises of the
city's police power to protect the residents of Tiburon from the
ill effects of urbanization. Such governmental purposes long have
been recognized as legitimate." 83
In addressing the benefits and burdens of the zoning ordi-
nance the Court found:
The zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the
public by serving the city's interest in assuring careful and or-
derly development of residential property with provision for
78. Id. at 1564-65 (footnotes omitted).
79. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
80. See id. at 258.
81. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 261 (citations omitted).
83. Id. (footnote omitted).
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open-space areas. There is no indication that the appellants' 5-
acre tract is the only property affected by the ordinances. Ap-
pellants therefore will share with other owners the benefits and
burdens of the city's exercise of its police power. In assessing
the fairness of the zoning ordinances, these benefits must be
considered along with any diminution in market value that the
appellants might suffer.84
Agins, which was cited by the Court in Dolan and Lucas, con-
firms that a comprehensive zoning scheme with a goal of
preventing or controlling development of open space, and that
effectively allows existing, economically-viable uses of the land to
continue, does not violate the Fifth Amendment.5 In short, fed-
eral jurisprudence recognizes, and protects from successful tak-
ings challenge, measured natural resource protection goals
achieved through zoning laws.
B. One State's Perspective of Takings and Natural Resource Protection
- The Wisconsin View
Since most controversies surrounding local zoning actions are
ultimately resolved in state, not federal, courts,8 6 it is appropriate
that we analyze how these issues are resolved by a state judiciary.
Wisconsin caselaw provides such an illustration.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of
takings in the context of a local zoning ordinance that was
aimed at preserving existing use of property for natural resource
protection. In Zealy v. City of Waukesha, the plaintiff, Zealy, owned
10.4 acres of land.8 7 Approximately 8.2 acres of that parcel was
re-zoned, along with 20 acres under other ownership, from R-1,
which permits residential use, to C-1, conservancy district, which
is to protect wetlands and which allows agricultural use. When
Zealy brought his action seeking compensation for an alleged
taking due to the re-zoning, he used his property for peat min-
ing.8 8 There was evidence that the re-zoning did indeed lower
the value of Zealy's property. Prior to the zoning change the City
84. Id. at 262.
85. See id. at 260-64.
86. See, e.g., North Haven Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Upjohn
Co., 753 E Supp. 423, 427 (D. Conn. 1990).
87. 548 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Wis. 1996).
88. Id. at 530.
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assessed the property at $81,000, whereas, after the zoning
change, the assessed value was $57,000.89
The Wisconsin Supreme Court viewed the Zealy case as an op-
portunity to "settle issues presently unclear in [Wisconsin's] law
of regulatory takings."90 After reviewing the leading United States
Supreme Court cases concerning takings, the court concluded
that Wisconsin caselaw only worded the takings test in a slightly
different manner.91 According to the court, "the rule emerging
from opinions of our state courts and the United States Supreme
Court is that a regulation must deny the landowner all or sub-
stantially all practical uses of a property in order to be consid-
ered a taking for which compensation is required."92
Further, the court concluded that the "property" at issue was
the entire 10.4-acre parcel, since the court found that there was
no convincing support in the decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court for the segmentation of property ownership in the
context of a takings evaluation.93 The court noted that 2.1 acres
of the parcel were unaffected by the re-zoning and were still
zoned for residential use. Also, the City's assessment indicated
that the property retained approximately 75% of its pre-zoning
change assessed valuation.94 The court stated, "[fiinally, we note
that under the City's current zoning ordinance, the 8.2 acres of
land zoned C-1 may still be used for its historical use, farming.
Viewed as a whole the parcel retains a combination of residen-
tial, commercial, and agricultural uses." 95 Hence, the court could
not conclude that the re-zoning "deprived Zealy of all or sub-
89. See id.
90. Id. at 531.
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 533.
94. See id. at 534. Zealy disputed the assessed value of his land
claiming that the property would be worth $200,000 if residential uses
were allowed. See id. The court responded to Zealy's argument by stat-
ing: "While loss of value is to be considered in determining whether a
restriction is a constructive taking, value based upon changing the
character of the land at the expense of harm to public rights is not an
essential factor or controlling." Id.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
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stantially all of the use of his land." 96 There was no taking.
7
Again, the crucial point is that even after the imposition of the
land use restrictions, the property may be used in the same man-
ner as before the re-zoning. When the zoning restriction merely
preserves an existing rural use, such as an agricultural use, it is
not considered a taking.98
This concept was touched upon by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Just v. Marinette County,99 when it made the distinction
between restrictions imposed to create a public benefit, as op-
posed to those imposed to prevent a public harm.1° Just con-
cerned shoreland zoning provisions designed to protect wetlands.
There, the court concluded that the "exercise of the police
power in zoning must be reasonable and we think it is not an
unreasonable exercise of that power to prevent harm to public
rights by limiting the use of private property to its natural
uses."101 The protection of natural resources is certainly an ap-
propriate goal of zoning restrictions in Wisconsin. As the court
stated in Zealy, "Wisconsin has a long history of protecting its
water resources, its lakes, rivers, and streams, which depend on
wetlands for their proper survival." 1°2
Notwithstanding the government's ability to effectuate such
natural resource protection through the imposition of local land
use controls at no cost to the public fisc, there is movement in
Wisconsin to adopt strategies employed by the federal govern-
ment in the Forest Legacy and Wedand Reserve programs. That
is, the purchase of private property rights, such as conservation
easements, are being advocated as the favored mechanism to




99. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
100. See id. at 767-68.
101. Id. at 768.
102. Zealy, 548 N.W.2d at 535.
103. Under the heading of protecting "prime agricultural land
and sensitive natural areas," and "private property rights," Wisconsin's
State Interagency Land Use Council, which was convened by the Gover-
nor, recommends that "the potential use of Purchase of Development
Rights (PDRs), Transfer of Development Rights (TDRs) and other
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ernment, though, the state and local governments of Wisconsin
clearly have existing authority to impose land use restrictions on
private land. The appropriate question for Wisconsin -
"America's Dairyland" - is "why buy the cow, when you can get
the milk for free?"
CONCLUSION
As seen from the above discussion, fear of taking due to impo-
sition of measured land use controls is not warranted. It cannot
be credibly argued that the purchase of development rights is
necessary to protect natural resources due to constitutional tak-
ings provisions. As the federal government has discovered
through its conservation easement purchase programs, it is politi-
cally easier to buy protection then it is to mandate it. Perhaps
such political expediency is a reason why some, at a state level
(as seen in Wisconsin), are also advocating the purchase of de-
velopment rights, presumably via mechanisms such as conserva-
tion easements.
It is not fiscally conservative, or even appropriate, for govern-
ments to embark upon a program of buying natural resource
protection when they can, through the exercise of existing au-
thorities, achieve the same level of protection at no public cost.
This is not to suggest that there will not be times when a state or
local government will have to purchase property rights in order
to secure the necessary level of protection or public use. Also,
the purchase of private property rights by private land trusts is
often the only mechanism such organizations have at their dispo-
forms of compensation should also be fully explored" by local units of
governments. PLANNING WISCONSIN: REPORT OF THE STATE INTERAGENCY
LAND USE COUNCIL TO GOVERNOR TOMMY G. THOMPSON 13 (July 1,
1996). Similarly, the Chamber of Commerce of scenic Door County,
Wisconsin has developed a program in an attempt to insure that Door
County retains its charm and attraction to tourists, who greatly support
its economy. In addition to advocating the adoption of zoning ordi-
nances, the Chamber is also recommending that municipalities of the
county purchase development rights to check unwanted development.
See Resolution of the Door County Chamber of Commerce Board of
Directors, Door County Chamber Resolves to Rein In Development Forces (Aug.
22, 1996).
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sal, as they lack the police power possessed by government. But
when government purchases property rights merely to limit use
of property to substantially its current use, that very action rein-
forces erroneous expectations on the part of many members of
the public that their property rights are inviolate.
Certainly, such expectations help fuel legislative proposals that
have surfaced recently in Congress, as well as the Wisconsin legis-
lature, which require government compensation for diminution
of value, irrespective of whether there exists a constitutionally
compensable taking.3 4 These expectations will also make it politi-
cally more difficult for local governments to enact zoning restric-
tions, for residents will have a false view of the need for compen-
sation. After all, as Justice Holmes recognized in 1922,
"[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values inci-
dent to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law."105 Natural resource pro-
tection proponents should pause to consider the potential long-
term consequences before advocating government purchase of
private property rights.
George Perkins Marsh was correct when he argued, in the
nineteenth century, that it was in the best interests of society to
have restrained use of forests and fields in order to protect the
land from consumptive uses that would otherwise forever change
the landscape. Twentieth century governmental bodies should
own up to their inherent responsibility in meeting those societal
interests. Concomitant to that responsibility exists the long-
standing authority of government to effect that end through
state and local land use controls. This type of natural resource
protection does not need to be bought with federal dollars by far
away government agencies. It can be achieved through the cost
effective and politically responsive processes of local government.
As basic is the threat of development, so basic is its solution.
104. See Carlyle H. Whipple, Just v. Marinette County Revisited: Con-
tract with America Redefines Land Use Regulation, Wis. LAw., June 1995, at
10.
105. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
